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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE
PROCESS AND INTERSTATE PRISON
TRANSFERS
Olim v. Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Olim v. Wainekona,' the United States Supreme Court clarified
its position as to when the involuntary relocation of a duly convicted
prisoner implicates a liberty interest protected by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 2 The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Blackmun, held that an interstate prison transfer does not directly deprive the inmate of any liberty interest protected by the due process
clause, even if the transfer involves long distances and an ocean crossing.3 The Court further held that Hawaii's prison regulations 4 do not
create a constitutionally protected liberty interest because they do not
substantially limit the prison administrator's discretion in making trans5
fer decisions.
An analysis of the Court's recent treatment of other cases involving
prison transfers yields the conclusion that the Wainekona Court logically
and convincingly applied the "entitlement" 6 view of liberty interests in
deciding that the transfer did not directly implicate the due process
clause. In the second part of the opinion, the Court correctly decided
that Hawaii's prison regulations do not create such a liberty interest.
Here, the majority applied the correct standards concerning the issue of
official discretion, while the dissent wrongly viewed Wakinekona as indistinguishable from a seemingly inconsistent previous decision of the
Court.
II.

BACKGROUND

While he was serving a sentence of life imprisonment without possi1 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983).
2 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides: "No State shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ...
" U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, § 1.
3 103 S. Ct. at 1746-47.
4 See infa notes 10-15, 19 and accompanying text.
5 103 S. Ct. at 1747-48.
6 See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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bility of parole 7 at the Hawaii State Prison near Honolulu, Delbert
Kaahanui Wakinekona was classified as a maximum security risk and
placed in the maximum control unit. After an apparent breakdown in
discipline and the failure of programs within this unit, a prison "Program Committee" held hearings to determine the causes of the
problems." The Committee designated Wakinekona as one of the troublemakers and informed him that another hearing would be held, pursuant to Rule IV of the Supplemental Rules and Regulations of the
Corrections Division, to determine whether he should be reclassified,
and whether he should be transferred to another Hawaii institution or
to one on the mainland. 9
Rule IV sets forth certain procedures that are to be followed in the
inmate classification and transfer processes. The Rule requires that a
hearing be held prior to a prison transfer that involves "a grievous loss
to the inmate"' 0 and that the inmate receive certain procedural protections, such as notice of the hearing and the opportunity to cross examine
witnesses and retain counsel."1 The Rule also requires that the prison
administrator establish "an impartial Program Committee" to conduct
the hearing, and that the Committee be "composed of at least three
members who were not actively involved in the process by which the
inmate

. .

.

was brought before the Committee."

12

At Wakinekona's hearing, which was conducted by the same persons who had presided over the hearings designed to identify the troublemakers, the Committee recommended that his classification as a
maximum security risk be continued 3 and that he be transferred to a
prison on the mainland. 14 Rule IV provides that the prison administra7 Wakinekona was serving sentences for murder, rape, robbery, and escape, among other
crimes. 103 S. Ct. at 1743. The notice that the Program Committee of the Hawaii State
Prison sent to California prison authorities stated that Wakinekona "is considered to be the
most dangerous and assaultive inmate in the Hawaii prison system ...
" Wakinekona v.
Olim, 664 F.2d 708, 709 (9th Cir. 1981) rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983).
8 103 S. Ct. at 1743.
9 Id
10 Dep't of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, Supplementary Rules and Regulations of the Corrections Division, Rule IV (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hawaii, Supplementary Rules and Regulations, Rule IV].
11 Other procedural protections provided the inmate under Rule IV include the opportunity to examine all relevant, non-confidential material related to his case, and the opportunity to offer evidence in his own behalf. Id.
12 Id
13 103 S.Ct. at 1743.
14 The prison Program Committee recommended that Wakinekona be transferred to Fol-

som State Prison in California "because of reports that he frequently threatened and intimidated prison guards." Wakinekona, 664 F.2d at 709. There were no other maximum-security
prisons in Hawaii that could have offered Wakinekona the correctional programs he needed
and he was unable to remain at the maximum control unit because of the planned construction of a new facility there. Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. at 1743.
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tor, as the "final decisionmaker," can "[a]ffirm or reverse, in whole or in
part, the recommendation" or can "hold in abeyance any action he believes jeopardizes the safety, security, or welfare of the staff, inmate...,
other inmates . . .,institution, or community and refer the matter back
to the Program Committee for further study and recommendation." 15
Antoine Olim, the administrator of the Hawaii State Prison, accepted
the Committee's recommendation, and a few days later Wakinekona
16
was transferred to Folsom State Prison in California.
Wakinekona filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 198317 against Olim and
the members of the Program Committee, claiming that the Committee's
decision violated his right to due process.' 8 Specifically, he alleged that
the decision had been rendered by a biased and prejudicial board composed of the same people who had initiated the hearings and, hence,
violated Rule IV.'9 The United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii dismissed Wakinekona's suit. 20 The court held that Rule IV did
not create a protected liberty interest because the Rule granted "practically unlimited discretion" to Hawaiian prison authorities regarding
transfers of ihmates.2 1 In so deciding, the District Court limited its inquiry to whether the state regulations created a liberty interest protected
22
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
15 Hawaii, Supplementary Rules and Regulations, Rule IV, 13d(3).
16 103 S. Ct. at 1743.
17 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
18 Wakinekona v. Olim, 459 F. Supp. 473, 474 (D. Hawaii 1978) rev'd, 664 F.2d 708 (9th
Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983).
19 Seesupra note 12 and accompanying text. Wakinekona also claimed that his transfer
violated the purpose of the program classification hearing as governed by Hawaii state regulations. Wakinekona, 459 F. Supp. at 474-75. According to paragraph I of Rule IV, the classification process
never inflicts punishment; on the contrary, even the imposition of a stricter classification
is intended to be in the best interests of the individual, the State, and the community. In
short, classification is a continuing evaluation of each individual to ensure that he is
given the optimum placement within the Corrections Division.
Hawaii, Supplementary Rules and Regulations, Rule IV, 1, (1976).
20 459 F. Supp. at 476.
21 Id. Two years before Wakinekona's suit, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii had held that Rule IV's requirement of a hearing before a fair and impartial
board gave rise to a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Wakinekona v. Doi, 421 F. Supp. 83 (D.Hawaii 1976). The District Court was
persuaded to reverse its position in light of Lombardo v. Meachum, where the First Circuit
held that prison regulations that do not impose substantive limitations on the decision to
transfer a prisoner do not create a protected liberty interest. 548 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1977).
22 In light of its decision that there was no longer a substantial federal due process claim
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-

cuit reversed, 23 concluding that "the Hawaii prison regulations created
a liberty interest subject to due process protection.

' 24

The court deter-

mined that the transfer regulations embodied in Rule IV, which require
that certain procedures be followed whenever a transfer involves a
"grievous loss" to the prisoner,2 5 "create a justifiable expectation that a

prisoner will not be transferred absent the specified procedures" and
"consequently give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

' 26

The Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument that the prison administrator has unfettered discretion to transfer inmates at will, stating
that the procedural conditions "certainly do not contemplate" such a
transfer. 27 The court decided that Wakinekona, who had not been

given an impartial tribunal 2 8 had stated a claim under 42 U.S.C.
29
§ 1983, and therefore reversed the District Court's dismissal of his suit.
The court declined to address the issue of whether the transfer of
Wakinekona from Hawaii to California directly implicated the due process clause because it concluded that the state regulations did create a
30
liberty interest.

Before the Court of Appeals handed down its decision, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii held that Rule IV did not limit the administrator's

discretion in transferring prisoners, and therefore does not "clothe"
plaintiffs with a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 3 1 In an opinion denying a petition for re-

hearing in. the Wakinekona case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
to which claims arising exclusively under the Hawaii State Constitution, regulations, and
statute could be appended, the District Court also held that Wakinekona's state claims must
be heard in the state court. Wakinekona v. Olim, 459 F. Supp. at 476.
23 Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1981) (divided opinion).
24 Id. at 710.
25 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
26 664 F.2d at 711-12.
27 Id. at 712. Further, the court maintained that the purpose of the procedural requirements, "to protect against arbitrary or uninformed action" by the prison official, "cannot be
reduced to constitutional insignificance." Id.
28 The court agreed with Wakinekona's claim that, because the Committee that had recommended his transfer also initiated his transfer proceedings, he had been deprived of an
impartial tribunal. Id.
29 Id.

30 The Court of Appeals, while resolving only the issue of whether the prison regulations
created a protected liberty interest, nevertheless noted its previous decisions in which it held
that an inmate's transfer from Hawaii to California does not directly implicate the due process clause. See id. at 710 n.1 (citing Fajeriak v. McGinnis, 493 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1974);
Hillen v. Director of Dep't of Social Services, 455 F.2d 510 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989
(1972)(involving interstate transfers from Alaska)). The court noted, however, that these
cases were decidedpn'or to Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), where the Supreme Court
held that intrastate prison transfers do not necessarily trigger due process protections.
31 Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Hawaii 138, 145, 621 P.2d 976, 981 (1981).
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Hawaii Supreme Court's interpretation of the state regulations was similar to its own, but that the courts disagreed on the federal question of
whether the interest created by the regulations should be given fourteenth amendment protection. 3 2 Hence, the Court of Appeals upheld its
decision 33 and in so doing declined to follow other circuits which had
held that liberty interests were not created by state regulations which
merely mandate certain procedures. 34 Since the Court of Appeals' decision created a conflict among the circuits on that issue, and because the
case also presented the issue of whether such an interstate prison transfer
directly implicates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
35
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

III.
A.

DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

THE MAJORITY OPINION

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. 36
First, the Court addressed the issue of whether the interstate prison
transfer directly implicated the due process clause, a matter resolved
neither by the District Court nor the Court of Appeals.3 7 The Court

adhered to the principle it had established in Aeachum v. Fano,38 that a
prisoner has a liberty interest in being confined "within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to
impose."' 39 In determining whether the State had exceeded such limits
thus directly implicating the prisoner's protected liberty interest, the
32 Wakinekona, 664 F.2d at 714-15.
33 Id. at 715.
34 See, e.g., Cofone v. Manson, 594 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1979); Lombardo v. Meachum, 548
F.2d 13 (st Cir. 1977). In Lombardo, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
rejected a prisoner's claim that his transfer from one Massachusetts prison to another violated
the due process clause, because the statutes and regulations in question did not "establish that
Massachusetts law limits transfers to those instances in which specified events have occurred."
548 F.2d at 15. The regulations, stated the court, "simply provide that an inmate will receive
a certain type of a hearing before he is reclassified." Id. The court concluded that the provisions were either merely "general statements of the purposes of the Massachusetts system of
corrections" or "general directives to the correctional system as to how to treat inmates." Id.
In Cofone, the Second Circuit held that a statute authorizing the Connecticut Commissioner of Corrections to transfer a state prisoner into federal custody when the inmate needs
special treatment or facilities, does not create a justifiable expectation for the prisoner that he
would not be transferred absent misbehavior or other specified event. 594 F.2d at 938. Thus,
the transfer of a prisoner from a Connecticut correctional institution to a federal penitentiary
in Atlanta, Georgia, did not violate the due process clause. Id. at 939.
35 Olim v. Wakinekona, 456 U.S. 1005 (1982).
36 Olim v. Wakinekona, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1748 (1983). Joining Justice Blackmun in the
majority opinion were Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor.
37 See sura notes 22, 30 and accompanying text.
38 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
39 Id. at 225.
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Court utilized the test it had established in Kitek v. Jones.4° Under this
test, confinement directly implicates a liberty interest when the "consequences visited on the prisoner are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime. ' 41 In
Wakinekona, the Court rejected respondent Wakinekona's argument that
confinement of a Hawaii prisoner on the mainland is "qualitatively different" from the normal circumstances faced such by a prisoner. 42 Instead, the Court decided that the interstate transfer of Wakinekona,
which involved long distances and an ocean crossing, differed from an
intrastate transfer only in degree, not in kind.43 In Meachum, the Court
had held that the "Due Process Clause in and of itself [does not] protect
a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one institution to another within the state prison system." 4 4 Hence, because the determining
factor in such a due process inquiry is the "nature of the interest involved rather than its weight," 45 the Wakinekona Court was compelled
under Meachum to conclude that an interstate prison transfer, even from
Hawaii to California, does not directly deprive the prisoner of any lib46
erty interest protected by the due process clause.
As further support for this decision, the Court noted that an inmate
"has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State, '47 indeed, that confinement in the prisoner's home state will
often not be possible for a variety of reasons. 48 Furthermore, state and
federal statutes,49 interstate agreements, 50 and prison regulations 5 l in445 U.S. 480 (1980).
Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
42 Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. at 1745.
43 Id. at 1746-47.
44
Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225.
45 Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. at 1747 (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)).
46 Id. at 1747.
47 Id. at 1745.
48 The Court discussed such reasons as overcrowding; the need to separate certain prisoners; lack of prison facilities with appropriate correctional programs within the State; and the
lack within the State of a federal correctional facility in which to place one convicted of a
federal crime. Id. at 1745-46.
49 On the federal level, 18 U.S.C. § 5003(a)(1976) provides in pertinent part:
The Attorney General, when the Director shall certify that proper and adequate treatment facilities and personnel are available, is hereby authorized to contract with the
proper officials of a State or Territory for the custody, care, subsistence, education, treatment, and training of persons convicted of criminal offenses in the courts of such State or
Territory....
As the majority noted, this statute was invoked to transfer Hawaii prisoners from state facilities to federal prisons on the mainland in Anthony v. Wilkinson, 637 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir.
1980), vacated andremandedsub nom. Hawaii v. Mederios, 453 U.S. 902 (1981). Wakinekona, 103
S. Ct. at 1746 n.7.
Also on the federal level, 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (Supp. V 1981) provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of providing suitable quarters for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence
of all persons held under authority of any enactment of Congress, the Attorney General
40
41
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clude provisions that suggest that interstate transfers of prisoners may be
necessary. Thus, the Court concluded that confinement in another state
is "neither unreasonable nor unusual" and therefore is "within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the
5' 2
State to impose."
The majority next rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Rule
IV creates a constitutionally protected liberty interest.5 3 The Court began by summarizing the established legal rule that a State may create a
liberty interest for prisoners by placing substantive limitations on the
discretion employed by officials in making decisions which adversely affect the prisoners.5 4 The Court noted that Hawaii's regulations do not
limit the prison administrator's discretion and therefore create no liberty
may contract, for a period not exceeding three years, with the proper authorities of any
State, Territory, or political subdivision thereof, for the imprisonment, subsistence, care,
and proper employment of such persons ...
At the state level, a relevant Hawaii statute provides that "[t]he director of social services
shall, with the approval of the governor, effect the transfer of a state prisoner to any federal
correctional institution for imprisonment, subsistence, care, and proper employment of such a
prisoner." HAWAII REV. STAT. § 353-18 (1976). An Alaska statute provides that the "commissioner may designate any available, suitable and appropriate facility for the service of
sentence by a prisoner. . . whether or not it is in another state, territory or possession of the
United States." ALAsKA STAT. § 33.30.100 (1982).
50 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 355-1 (1976)(codifying the Western Interstate Corrections Compact). The Western Interstate Corrections Compact provides, inter alia, that
"[e]ach party state may make one or more contracts with any one or more of the other party
states for the confinement of inmates on behalf of a sending state in institutions situated
within receiving states." Id. The statutory codification of the Compact further provides:
Whenever the duly constituted judicial or administrative authorities in a state party to
this compact. . . shall decide that. . . transfer of an inmate to an institution within the
territory of another party state is necessary in order to provide. . . an appropriate program of rehabilitation or treatment, said officials may direct that the confinement be
within an institution within the territory of said other party state ...
Id.
51 For example, Rule V of Hawaii's Supplementary Rules and Regulations of the Corrections Division provides that a prisoner may retain counsel if his reclassification hearing concerns a "potential interstate transfer," and hence, recognizes that such transfers do occur.
Hawaii, Supplementary Rules and Regulations, Rule V.
52 Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting Meechum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)).
53 The Court has recognized that state statutes can create liberty or property interests
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. For example, the Court, in
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), explained that
[p]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Id. at 577. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court established that
state prison regulations can create protected liberty interests for inmates. Id. at 557.
54 Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. at 1747. For there to be a state-created liberty interest, a prisoner must demonstrate that the decisionmaker is "required to base its decisions on objective
and defined criteria." Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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interest entitled to due process protection. 5 5 Here, the Court used the
traditional approach it had set forth in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates 5 6 -a case-by-case examination of the structure and language of
the regulations. The crucial inquiry was whether Rule IV provides that
transfers be "conditioned upon certain specified events, ' 57 and the
Court agreed with the Hawaii Supreme Court that "the prison administrator's discretion to transfer an inmate is completely unfettered.15 8 The
59
Court noted that the Program Committee is purely advisory in nature,
while the administrator is the only decisionmaker. 6° The Court of Appeals had erred in viewing as significant the procedural requirements
listed in the regulations. 6 1 The Court. stated that a liberty interest is
substantive in nature and not merely the "right to demand needless formality. ' 62 Although due process serves to "protect a substantive interest
to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement," the complete discretion given the administrator implies that there was no such
63
interest here to protect.
B.

THE DISSENT'S OPINION

In his dissent, Justice Marshall attacked both conclusions reached
by the majority. First, Marshall concluded that the transfer of
Wakinekona from Hawaii to California directly implicated a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 64 Unlike the majority, Marshall found
that this interstate prison transfer effects consequences qualitatively different from those usually suffered by a convict. 65 Marshall characterized the 4,000 mile transfer as a banishment, which imposed upon
Wakinekona an isolation "far more drastic than that which normally
accompanies imprisonment. ' 66 Marshall rejected the majority's assumption that interstate prison transfers are common. By pointing to
criminal justice statistics which suggested that very few prisoners held in
state prisons were transferred to other jurisdictions, 67 he concluded that
55 Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. at 1747.
56 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979).

Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226-27.
Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. at 1747 (citing Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Hawaii 138, 144-45, 621
P.2d 976, 980-81 (1981)); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
59 For a discussion of this Committee's role, see supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
60 Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. at 1748.
61 Id.
62 Id. (quoting Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1982)).
63 Id. at 1748.
64 Id. at 1749-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Stevens agreed with
Marshall's opinion on this issue. See id. at 1748.
65 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
66 103 S. Ct. at 1749.
67 Marshall pointed out that less than 3% of Hawaii state prisoners were transferred to
57
58
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respondent's transfer was a qualitatively different punishment. 68 Marshall distinguished Meachum v. Fano, the case under which the Court had

felt compelled to decide Wakinekona,69 by concluding that it had specifically dealt with intrastate transfers. Meachum rested on the accepted
premise that the initial decision of where to place a prisoner within the
state does not implicate a liberty interest. 70 Marshall stated, however, a
state's initial placement of a prisoner outside the state, a long distance

71
away from home and family, could raise due process questions.
Justice Marshall then concluded that the majority had wrongly decided that Hawaii's prison regulations give the administrator complete
discretion in transferring prisoners, and that, in actuality, the regula-

tions do create a liberty interest. 72 He noted that Rule IV establishes
procedural rules 73 and limitations on official discretion 74 that "are at
least as substantial as those found sufficient to create a liberty interest in
Hewitt v. Helms,"' 75 a case decided earlier in the Term. 76 And, while he
concluded that Rule IV does provide that the ultimate decision rests
solely in the hands of the prison administrator, Marshall nevertheless
reasoned that the regulations created a "protectible expectation" that
transfers would not occur for wholly arbitrary reasons. 77 As additional
support for his conclusion that the regulations do create a protected liberty interest, Marshall cited the Court's decision in Hewitt, which "reject[ed] the view that state laws which impose substantive limitations
and elaborate procedural requirements on official conduct create no liberty interest solely because there remains the possibility that an official
another jurisdiction in 1979; that less than 1%nationwide were transferred to other jurisdictions; and that 70% of all state inmates are in institutions less than 250 miles from home. Id.
at 1750 & n.4.
68 Id. at 1750.
69 See supra notes 38-39, 44-47 and accompanying text.
70 See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
71 Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. at 1749-50.
72 Only Justice Brennan agreed with Marshall's conclusion on this issue. Id. at 1748.
73 Justice Marshall noted that the "procedural rules are cast in mandatory language and
cover such matters as notice, access to information, hearing, confrontation and cross-examination, and the basis on which the [Program] Committee is to make its recommendation to the
faculty administrator." Id. at 1751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74 The dissent viewed the purpose clause of Rule IV as restricting the administrator's
discretion. Id. at 1752. This clause provides that transfers are intended to ensure an inmate's
"optimum placement" in consideration of "his changing needs, the resources and facilities
available to the Corrections Division, the other inmates/wards, the exigencies of the community, and any other relevant factors." Id. at 1751 n.6.
75 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983). For an analysis of Hewitt, see infa notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
76 Further, Marshall viewed the procedural requirements of Hawaii's prison regulations
as far more elaborate than those in the state regulations involved in Hewitt. Wakinekona, 103
S. Ct. at 1751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 1752.
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will act in an arbitrary manner at the end of the process."' 78 In so doing,
the dissent declined to follow Lono v. Arz3'oshi, 79 the Hawaii Supreme
Court decision that the majority cited for its conclusion that the prison
administrator's discretion was unfettered, because Marshall found Lono
to be inconsistent with recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. 80
IV.

ANALYSIS

This Note will first show that the Supreme Court convincingly applied the standards set forth in Meachum in concluding that the interstate transfer of respondent Wakinekona did not directly implicate the
due process clause. Conversely, the dissent's rationale is unpersuasive
and lacks precedential support. Second, this Note will show that the
Court's decision that Hawaii's prison regulations do not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest was correct and consistent with its
previous rulings on state-created liberty interests.
A.

DIRECT IMPLICATIONS OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

In determining that Wakinekona's transfer did not directly implicate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme
Court used very sound reasoning and wisely felt compelled to decide this
issue according to its decision in Aeachum v. Fano.81 In Meachum, the
Court held that an intrastate prison transfer does not directly trigger
due process protection.8 2 The Court there used the "entitlement" approach to due process analysis under which one alleging to have a liberty interest "clearly must have more than an abstract need...,
desire. . ., [or] unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
'
legitimate claim of entitlement to it." 83
78 Id. Marshall also cited Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979),
where the Court held that the expectancy of release provided by a statute on parole was
entitled to some constitutional protection, id. at 12, even though the Parole Board ultimately
could deny parole for any reason it deemed relevant. Id. at 18. For a more detailed discussion of the Greenholtz decision, see infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
79 63 Hawaii 138, 621 P.2d 976 (1981); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
80 Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. at 1752 n.13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
82 Id. at 225. In Meachum, respondent inmates of a medium-security institution were given
individual classification hearings, after which the Classification Board recommended to the
Acting Deputy Commissioner for Classification and the Commissioner of Corrections that the
inmates be transferred intrastate to institutions where the living conditions were substantially
less favorable. These recommendations were accepted and the transfers were carried out. Id.
at 216-21. Respondents then brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) against the
prison officials, alleging that they were deprived of liberty without due process of law because
they were transferred to a less favorable institution without an adequate fact-finding hearing.
Id. at 222.
83 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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The Meachum Court clarified the nature of the liberty interest a
prisoner actually possesses under this "entitlement" approach. The
Court noted that a prisoner has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in being confined "within the normal limits or range of custody
which the conviction has authorized the State to impose."8 4 Specifically,
the prisoner has a liberty interest in not being subjected to confinement
that brings about "consequences . . . qualitatively different from the

punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of
crime. "85

The majority in Wainekona correctly applied these standards in
concluding that the difference between Wakinekona's transfer, which involved a long distance and an ocean crossing, and an intrastate transfer
or interstate transfer of shorter distance is "a matter of degree, not of
kind."8 61 The Court appropriately noted that respondent faced the same
hardships that intrastate transferees suffered: separation from home,
family, and inmate friends; placement in a possibly hostile environment;
interruption of educational and rehabilitative programs; and difficulty
in contacting counsel.8 7 The Court correctly reasoned that the circumstances of respondent's transfer affected the weight and not the nature of
the interest involved. Surely respondent faced quantilatively greater
hardships than do most prison transfers, but nevertheless "[t]he fact that
his confinement takes place outside Hawaii is merely a fortuitous consequence of the fact that he must be confined, not an additional element
of his punishment." 8
Wainekona can be distinguished from Vitek v. Jones,89 where the
Court held that involuntary commitment of prisoners to a mental hospital was not "within the range of conditions of confinement to which a
prison sentence subjects an individual." 9° Whereas Wakinekona's transfer would subject him to essentially the same hardships that faced the
intrastate transferees in Meachum, it would not subject him to two kinds
of losses suffered by the transferee to a mental hospital: namely, the
stigmatizing effects of such a transfer and the mandatory behavior modification therapy given for mental illness. 9 1 Hence, a justifiable expectation does occur that an inmate will not be transferred to a mental
hospital absent a due process hearing concerning his classification as
"mentally ill" because placement in a mental hospital, unlike an inter84
85
86
87
88

Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225.
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980).
Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. at 1746-47.
See id. at 1747 n.9.

Id.

89 445 U.S. 480 (1980).

90 Id. at 493.
91 Id.

at 494.
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state prison transfer, does bring about qualitatively different consequences than those usually faced by prisoners. Therefore, the majority
was correct in concluding that a prisoner does not have a protectible
liberty interest in not being incarcerated outside his home state.
In contrast, the dissent unconvincingly reasoned that Wakinekona
does have such a liberty interest. Justice Marshall's analysis is actually
not what it purports to be, namely, one using the "entitlement" approach, but is rather an analysis based on the "impact" approach. The
"impact" approach is an alternative model of due process rights that the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected over a decade ago. 92 The "impact"
approach to due process required procedural protections where a "grievous loss" occurs to the prisoner as the result of a state disciplinary action. 93 Marshall clearly followed this approach, for what he actually
concluded was not that Wakinekona's transfer was a punishment qualitatively different from the norm, but rather that it was "far more drastic" ' 94 and thus quantitativeo different from normal incarceration. Indeed,
in attempting to analogize Wakinekona's transfer to a banishment,
Marshall emphasized the prisoner's separation from family and friends,
and his being "cut off from his only contacts with the outside world," 95
which are consequences faced by all convicts.
The Court was indeed compelled to decide the case under Meachum
because the types of consequences that Wakinekona faced as a result of
his transfer from Hawaii to California are the same as those faced by
prisoners who are transferred within the state. Wakinekona is thus best
viewed as a slight and logical extension of the rationale employed in
Meachum. Hence, the Court correctly held that the interstate transfer of
Wakinekona was "within the normal limits or range of custody" and
92 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); see also infra note 93.
93 The "impact" approach is illustrated by the Supreme Court's language in Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972): "[T]he liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes
many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on
the parolee . . . [and] calls for some orderly process ..
" Id. at 482. The Morrissey Court
was concerned with whether due process required that a State afford an individual procedural protections before revoking his parole.
Under the impact approach, the Court was only concerned with whether the "grievous
loss" suffered by the individual outweighed the State's interest in denying the procedural
safeguards. This approach was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972):
[A] weighing process has long been a part of any determination of theform of hearing
required in particular situations by procedural due process. But, to determine whether
due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to
the nature of the interest at stake.
Id. at 570-71 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
94 Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. at 1749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95 Id.
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that he therefore had no liberty interest in being incarcerated within the
State of Hawaii.
B.

STATE-CREATED LIBERTY INTERESTS

In the second part of the opinion, the majority applied the proper
standards concerning discretionary decisionmaking in deciding that Hawaii's prison regulations do not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest. In Wool'v. McDonnell,9% the Supreme Court established the
now well-settled concept that state law can create liberty interests entitled to protection under the due process clause. Essentially, a state can
statutorily create a protected liberty interest for prisoners by requiring
that the decisionmaker base decisions, such as whether to transfer a prisoner, on "objective and defined criteria. '97 The Court has indicated
that if the decisionmaker has complete discretion to transfer a prisoner
at will, then the prisoner's expectation that he will remain at a particular prison is "too . . . insubstantial to trigger procedural due process
protections.
...98
It is well established that a decision is based on "objective and de-

fined criteria" when a statute or regulation sets forth the exclusive conditions under which a prisoner can be transferred. 9 9

The Supreme

Court has also indicated that "objective and defined criteria" are present when the statute or regulation "use[s] language of an unmistakably

mandatory character" together with "specified substantive predicates"
96 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
97 Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). As the Supreme Court stated in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980):
[I]f the State grants a prisoner a right or expectation that adverse action will not be
taken against him except upon the occurrence of specified behavior, "the determination
of whether such behavior has occurred becomes critical, and the minimum requirements
of procedural due process appropriate for the circumstances must be observed."
Id. at 490-91 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)). The same standard
applies for state-created interests outside the prison context. See infta note 99.
98 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 228.
99 Id. at 226-27. It has also been established in cases outside the prison context that adverse action is based upon "objective and defined criteria" when the statute or regulation sets
forth the exclusive conditions under which a benefit may be denied. In Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974), the statute in question provided that a federal civil servant "may be
removed or suspended -withoutpay onl'y for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service." 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a)(1976) (emphasis added), quotedin Amett, 416 U.S. at 140. All of
the Justices, while differing over specifically what process was due, nevertheless agreed that,
since the statute mentioned the exclusive conditions under which the employee could be removed or suspended, the employee had a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment in the absence of the stated conditions. Amell, 416 U.S. at 151-55.
In Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), the applicable ordinance set forth several reasons for which a permanent employee could be dismissed. The Supreme Court defined the
critical inquiry as whether the ordinance conferred upon the employee a guarantee that dismissal would not occur absent these specific occurrences, or rather merely described procedures for such dismissal. Id. at 345.
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for the occurrence of the action. 10 0
It is clear that Rule IV is quite different from regulations that have
been found to have "objective and defined" criteria for decisionmaking.
In Greenholtz v. Nebraska PenalInmates,"'l the Court utilized this standard
for "substantive limitation on official discretion" in holding that the Ne0 2
braska statutory language created a protectible expectation of parole. 1
The statute in question provided that the Board of Parole "shall" order
an eligible prisoner's release on parole "unless" deferral is mandated by
any of four specific substantive determinations. 10 3 Further, the statute
provided a detailed list of fourteen explicit factors and one all-inclusive
factor which the Board was obligated to take into consideration in
reaching a parole decision. 10 4 In light of its "unique structure and language," the statute "create[d] a legitimate expectation of release absent
the requisite finding that one of the justifications for deferral exists."' 10 5
Unlike the Nebraska statute in Greenholtz, Rule IV contains neither
detailed criteria and standards nor language of a substantially
mandatory nature. While the Greenholtz statute specifically set forth four
situations under which deferral of a prisoner's release on parole is mandated, 10 6 Rule IV does not mention any substantive predicates that
must occur before a transfer is effected. Instead, Rule IV merely states
that the general purpose of transfers is to ensure the "optimum placement"' 1 7 of prisoners and serve the "best interests of the individual, the
State, and the community."' 10 8 Further, while the Nebraska statute set
forth in detailed fashion fourteen factors which the Board of Parole is
obligated to take into consideration, Rule IV only generally mentions
that the classification process "considers the individual, his history, his
changing needs, the resources and facilities available to the Corrections
Division, the other inmates/wards, the exigencies of the community,
and any other relevant factors."' 1 9 Also, Rule IV employs mandatory
language only with respect to procedural matters that the Program
Committee must afford the prisoner, and not to any substantive predicates that must occur before the prisoner is transferred. Use of
mandatory language in a statute or regulation is not sufficient to make
too

Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. at 871.

101 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
102

Id. at 12.

§ 83-1,114(1) (1976), quoted in Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11.
104 NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,114(2), quoted in Greenho/tz, 442 U.S. at 16-18 (Appendix to
103 NEB. REv. STAT.

Opinion of the Court).
105 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12.
106
107
108
109

See supra note 103.

See supra note 19.
Id.
Hawaii, Supplementary Rules and Regulations, Rule IV, 11.
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the decision a matter of "objective and defined criteria" unless it is used
"in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates.", 10 Because Rule IV neither uses mandatory language concerning the administrator's treatment of the Program Committee's recommendation 1 I nor
specifies that a transfer will not occur absent the occurrence of specified
' 12
events, the administrator's discretion is "completely unfettered."
Indeed, the regulations in Wakinekona are similar to those in Connecticut Board ofPardons v. D1umschat 1 13 and Meachum, two cases in which the
Court held that there was no "objective and defined criteria" on which
a decision must be founded. In Dumschat, the Court found that the statute "imposes no limit on what procedure is to be followed, what evidence may be considered, or what criteria are to be applied by the
Board."' 14 The Court stated that in comparison with the statutory provisions in Greenholtz, the "Connecticut commutation statute, having no
definitions, no criteria, and no mandated 'shalls,' creates no analogous
duty or constitutional entitlement."' 15
Similarly, Rule IV does not define what conditions must exist
before a prisoner is transferred, provides no criteria which must be followed by either the Program Committee or the administrator, and contains no mandatory language with respect to any action taken by the
ultimate decisionmaker.' 16 The regulations in Wakinekona are also similar to the statutory provisions involved in Meachum .117 Those provisions
did not limit the ability of the commissioner to transfer sentenced prisoners not only because they did not contain mandatory language, but
also because they did not condition the transfer upon the evaluation of
any specific criteria."18
The dissent wrongly asserted that Wakinekona was indistinguishable
from Hewitt v. Helms, 1' 9 where the Court had held that Pennsylvania
statutes and regulations setting forth procedures for confining an inmate
to administrative segregation gave prisoners a protected liberty interest
in remaining in the general prison population. In Hewitt, the Supreme
110
111
112
113
114

Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. at 871.
See suftra note 15 and accompanying text.
Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. at 1747.
452 U.S. 458 (1981).
Id. at 466.

115 Id.

116 See supra notes 15, 19, 109 and accompanying text.
117 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 97 (1974), quotedin Meachun, 427 U.S. at 227 n.7.
This statute provides that "[t]he commissioner may transfer any sentenced prisoner from one
correctional institution of the commonwealth to another. . . ." Id. (emphasis added). The
commissioner's discretion is limited only to the extent that he must secure the approval of the
county sheriff in certain cases. Id.
118 See sura note 117.
119 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983).
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Court noted that the Commonwealth "ha[d] gone beyond simple procedural guidelines" and had "used language of an unmistakably
mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures 'shall,' 'will,' or
'must' be employed. . . and that [the adverse action] . . .will not occur absent specified substantive predicates .... ,,120 The Pennsylvania
statute provided that an inmate would not be administratively segregated absent such specified substantive predicates, namely, "the need
for control" or "the threat of a serious disturbance."' 2' Thus, the statutory provision in Hewitt set forth conditions that must be present before
a prisoner could be administratively segregated. The institutional officer's discretion was there limited in that he could not confine a prisoner to Close or Maximum Administrative Custody unless "it has been
determined that there is a threat of a serious disturbance or a serious
122
threat to the individual or others."'
Rule IV, however, does not require that specified events or conditions must occur before the administrator transfers a prisoner and,
hence, does not limit his discretion in making the final decision. The
policy statement of Rule IV, which states that transfers are intended to
ensure a prisoner's "optimum placement," is very similar to the statutory provision involved in Lombardo v. Meachum. 123 There the First Circuit held that the provision, which defined the purpose of the
classification system as being the development of a rehabilitation program for each inmate did not "confer upon individual inmates, a right
not to be transferred absent a showing that specified events have
24
occurred."'
The dissent in Wakinekona correctly noted that a prison policy statement in Wright v. Enomoto 125 did create a protected expectation that segregation would not occur for arbitrary reasons with its language that
"inmates may be segregated for medical, psychiatric, disciplinary, or administrative reasons."' 126 This provision, however, specifically mentioned "exclusive conditions" under which segregation could occur and,
hence, gave the prisoner a justifiable expectation that segregation would
not occur in the absence of those conditions. In contrast, Rule IV does
not specifically mandate that certain criteria must be considered in the
decisionmaking process and, further, does not delineate any substantive
predicates upon which the transfer may be conditioned. Therefore, al120 Id. at 871.

121 Id. (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 95.104(b) (Purdon 1980)).
122 Id. at 871 n.6.
123 548 F.2d 13 (lst Cir. 1977).
124 Id. at 15.

125 Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Cal. 1976), afd, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
126 Id. at 403.
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though its language concerning procedural protection afforded the prisoner by the Program Committee is mandatory in nature, Rule IV does
not require that decisions be based on "objective and defined criteria"
because it does not set forth substantive predicates limiting official discretion. The fact that the administrator's discretion is unfettered implies that a prisoner can have no justifiable expectation that he will not
be transferred absent specific misbehavior or other occurences. Thus,
Rule IV does not create any liberty interest.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the decision in Wakinekona does not cross any new legal
frontiers, it does reflect the Court's position that due process protections
only apply where one is legitimately entitled to a liberty interest as well
as the Court's reluctance to impinge upon the discretion given prison
officials. The decision that the interstate transfer of respondent from
Hawaii to California does not directly implicate the due process clause is
a proper ruling which only slightly extends the Meackum decision. Finally, the Court's conclusion that Hawaii's prison regulations do not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest is also correct and sound
given the fact that the prison administrator certainly has unlimited discretion in transferring prisoners.
DAVID

P. BAUM

